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Inside or Outside the System?
Eric A. Posner * & Adrian Vermeule **
March 11, 2013
Abstract. In a typical pattern in the literature on public law, the diagnostic sections of a
paper draw upon political science, economics or other disciplines to offer deeply pessimistic
accounts of the motivations of relevant actors in the legal system. The prescriptive sections of the
paper, however, then issue an optimistic proposal that the same actors should supply publicspirited solutions. Where the analyst makes inconsistent assumptions about the motivations of
actors within the legal system, equivocating between external and internal perspectives, an
inside/outside fallacy arises. We identify the fallacy, connect it to an economics literature on the
“determinacy paradox,” and elicit its implications for the theory of public law.

Imagine a paper about constitutional theory that offers the following argument: “All
officials are ambitious, and thus prone to maximize their power. To solve the problem, judges
should adopt the following rules of constitutional doctrine....” 1 The natural reaction would be to
ask whether the diagnosis in the first sentence covers the judges as well; if it does, the
prescription in the second goes wrong by assuming public-spirited motivations on the part of the
judges who are asked to supply socially beneficial rules. Parallel questions arise, mutatis
mutandis, if the diagnosis is not that officials are ambitious, but that they are self-interested in
some other way, or are partisan, or ideological.
There are two ways of understanding what has gone wrong in this sort of argument. One
might say that the problem is one of incentive-compatibility: the diagnosis rests on an account of
the officials’ motivations that is inconsistent, at least prima facie, with the motivations that must
be present if the theorist’s solution is to be supplied by those very officials. At a deeper level,
however, the problem is that the theorist is skipping back and forth between two different
perspectives: an external perspective that attempts to explain the behavior of actors within the
constitutional order as an endogenous product of self-interested aims, and an internal perspective
that assumes the standpoint of the judge and asks how the judge ought to behave so as to
promote the well-being of the constitutional system and the nation. In cases of this sort, the
analyst is not doing ideal theory, which asks simply what well-motivated officials should do.
*
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1
Cf. Julian David Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 385 n.27
(2011) (claiming that the Madisonian theory of separation of powers rests on “the recognition of human ambition”
as opposed to “selfless patriotism,” yet also assuming that judges will use judicial review to promote the common
good, see id. at 425). These two views can be reconciled only by the further assumption that judges are not human.
**
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Rather the analyst is combining ideal with nonideal theory in an incoherent way, positing
nonideal motivations for purposes of diagnosis and then positing idealized motivations for
purposes of prescription.
The hypothetical example is crude in the extreme, but we believe that legal theory is rife
with examples that have essentially the same structure, and are only somewhat more subtle and
difficult to identify. We will thus attempt to identify and illustrate a problem or class of problems
-- the inside/outside fallacy -- that appears with some frequency in the theory of public law. The
inside/outside fallacy occurs when the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint of an
analyst of the constitutional order, such as a political scientist, and the internal standpoint of an
actor within the system, such as a judge 2 -- although there is nothing unique about judges in this
regard, and we will see examples in which the internal standpoint is that of some other type of
official. This equivocation yields a kind of methodological schizophrenia. In a typical pattern,
the diagnostic sections of a paper draw upon the political science literature to offer deeply
pessimistic accounts of the ambitious, partisan or self-interested motives of relevant actors in the
legal system, while the prescriptive sections of the paper then turn around and issue an optimistic
proposal for public-spirited solutions.
Our point is not substantive or empirical. It is not to argue for, or against, any particular
assumptions about the behavior of judges, other officials, or other legal or political actors. Rather
it is strictly a point about consistency -- the consistency of assumptions and perspectives. The
increasing cross-fertilization of legal theory with economics and political science, while highly
beneficial for all these fields, creates a methodological risk. The risk is that the analyst will
implicitly make one set of assumptions in one part of an argument, taking an external
perspective, while implicitly making different and inconsistent assumptions in another part,
taking an internal perspective. Our aim is to clarify the nature of this risk, to explain why it tends
to arise, and to show how it may be prevented.
The inside/outside problem is not unique to legal theory. 3 It is just that other disciplines
understand the problem and make best efforts to avoid it. There is an instructive parallel in the
2

On the difference between internal and external perspectives, see, for example, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (1961); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CAL. L. REV. 975 (2009); John Ferejohn, Positive
Theory and the Internal Point of View of Law, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 280 (2008). Law professors may of course
play either the role of the analyst, as when they attempt to explain judicial behavior, or the role of an actor within the
system, as when they argue cases or write briefs as amici curiae. The latter activities may blur the difference
between roles as a practical matter (and in some cases that blurring is precisely the point). Yet as a conceptual
matter, the distinction never blurs. Law professors may switch hats very rapidly, or try to wear two hats at once, but
that behavior is irrelevant to the conceptual distinction we draw.
3
Similar problems arise in Marxist theory. There is a standard tension between the external perspective of
“scientific socialism” -- according to which revolution becomes inevitable in the presence of certain economic and
social conditions -- and the internal perspective of political activists, who are committed to bringing about revolution
for normative reasons and through intentional action. “The horns of the dilemma are well known. Either the laws of
history operate with such iron necessity that political action is superfluous -- communism will somehow come about
‘by itself’ without propaganda, leadership or mass action -- or, if this view is discarded, as it must be, political action
must be guided by values.” JON ELSTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO KARL MARX 189 (1986). The standard response to
this tension is that the role of the revolutionary activist is to “shorten and lessen the birth pangs” of the inevitable
future. KARL MARX, Preface to CAPITAL: VOLUME ONE (First German ed. 1867), available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htm. That formulation in turn creates further problems; for
discussion, see ELSTER, supra, at 189–190. For an alternative attempt to resolve the tension, see G.A. COHEN,
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history and theory of welfare economics; here is a stylized version. At Time 1, welfare
economists assume a benevolent government that attempts to maximize some social welfare
function. These economists offer public-regarding advice to government officials based on the
assumption that those officials will implement the advice, if they find it persuasive about where
the public interest lies -- based, in other words, on the internal standpoint of a government
assumed to be well-motivated.
At Time 2, however, a new breed of public choice economist expands the scope of
economic theorizing to include the government officials themselves. These public choice
economists endogenously derive the behavior of officials from standard economic postulates,
usually by assuming that officials are both rational and self-interested. It then becomes painfully
apparent that the social welfare harms arising from self-interested official behavior cannot be
remedied by offering public-regarding advice to those same officials, as in the old welfare
economics. If the diagnosis offered by public choice economics is correct, the officials will not
be listening to public-regarding counsel as such. The only sort of advice to which the officials
might listen, even in principle, is a suggestion that the officials have mistaken where their own
self-regarding interest lies. The analyst must account not only for the demand side of the problem
(what solution a benevolent social planner would desire to institute) but also for the supply side
of the problem (who will have the incentives to supply that solution, given the analyst’s
diagnosis of the problem).
In the literature on welfare economics this insight goes by the name of the “determinacy
paradox.” 4 If the analyst endogenously derives the behavior of actors within the system for
purposes of diagnosis, the analyst must also endogenize those actors’ response to any advice the
analyst might give. If the analyst stands outside the system for purpose of diagnosis, it is
inconsistent to assume an internal standpoint for purpose of prescription, with the narrow
exception of strictly instrumental advice about how rationally self-interested actors may best
promote their interests. Our principal claim is that legal theory needs to absorb the insights of the
determinacy paradox. 5
Section I illustrates the inside/outside fallacy in three different settings: Madisonian
arguments that assume power-maximizing behavior by officials or institutions in the lawmaking
system (I.A); partisanship arguments that assume partisan behavior on the part of officials (I.B);
and process theory arguments that assume prejudiced behavior by majorities, self-entrenching
HISTORY, LABOUR AND FREEDOM: THEMES FROM MARX, ch. 4 (1988). Thanks to Jon Elster and Mark Tushnet for
guidance on these issues.
4
The original source is Jagdish Bhagwati et al., DUP Activities and Economic Theory, in NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY (David Colander ed., 1984). For extensive consideration, see the articles in a symposium in 9 ECON. &
POL. 205 (1997).
5
For an earlier effort along these lines, see Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency
Powers, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (2006). For legal scholarship that is sensitive to the relevant problems, see, e.g.,
Scott Baker & Anup Malani, The Problem of Rational Courts (arguing that if courts are as rational as the actors they
regulate, certain legal rules turn out to be inefficient) (draft on file with authors); James E. Fleming, Toward a More
Democratic Congress? 89 B.U. L. REV. 629, 640 (2009) (critiquing proposals to improve Congress by means that
require congressional approval); Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism about Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1473 (2008) (arguing that outside advisers on constitutional design will be ignored if their counsel
does not align with the incentives of local actors); Mark Tushnet, Self-Historicism, 38 TULSA L. REV. 771 (2003)
(critiquing historicist analysis of constitutional law when used to support normative recommendations to judges).
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behavior by incumbent officials, or rent-seeking behavior by organized groups (I.C). Across
these settings, we will see legal theorists drawing on the external standpoint of political science
literature with devastating effect, then abandoning that standpoint to offer public-spirited advice
to officials -- especially judges -- whose motivations that same literature brings into serious
question.
Section II turns to debates surrounding presidential power and prerogative. We detect
versions of the inside/outside fallacy in several common ideas in the relevant literatures. One is
the trope that, where emergencies require presidential action inconsistent with law, presidents
should violate the law, openly declare the violation to the public, and seek some sort of ex post
ratification -- a regime we call “responsible illegality.” Another is the idea, exemplified by
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 6 that judges should decline to
interfere with military action in wartime, but should also refuse to make a decision that upholds
the military action, for fear of creating a bad precedent. Both of these arguments commit the
same mistake, which is to imagine that presidents or judges can take actions that somehow stand
outside the constitutional system and will thus have no precedential effect inside that system. On
the contrary, whatever presidents and judges do creates a precedent to which the future may
point; there is no escaping the system from within. Although it is not initially obvious, this turns
out to embody the same sort of mistake highlighted by the determinacy paradox, or so we will
suggest.
Section III turns to the legal literature on interpretation and adjudication, while Section
IV discusses the literature on international law. In both settings, we identify examples of the
inside/outside fallacy that arise because of inconsistency between the empirical premises that
analysts or actors propound about (other) actors within the system, on the one hand, and the
normative proposals that analysts or actors offer on the other. In cases such as Bush v. Gore, 7 for
example, initial decisionmakers attempt to make one-off decisions with no precedential value,
but the attempt fails. The initial decisionmakers try to make a non-precedential decision because
they fear that downstream decisionmakers will use the precedent for ends the initial
decisionmakers do not want, but they overlook that the same motivations will cause the
downstream decisionmakers to ignore the instruction that the initial decision should be treated as
non-precedential.
In Section V, we distill the themes of our critique and indicate its limits. Diagnosis of the
inside/outside fallacy requires logical consistency between the behavioral assumptions
underlying the analyst’s diagnosis and prescription. In itself a requirement of consistency has
few substantive implications, in the sense that there is usually some logically consistent
combination of assumptions to justify almost any argument about constitutional design and
interpretation. Yet some such combinations will simply be implausible, and will thus be ruled out
by evidence if not by logic. And in any event the very exercise of making the assumptions
consistent has a disciplining effect. It should no longer be possible to combine pessimism about
diagnoses with unexplained optimism about solutions, as so much legal theory does. In a brief
conclusion, we suggest that awareness of the fallacies we discuss underscores the difficulty of
combining external political science with internal legal scholarship in a coherent way.
6
7

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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I. Madisonianism and its Competitors: Ambition, Partisanship, and Process Failures
Constitutional theory endlessly rings the changes on themes of ambition, partisanship,
and political process failures. Analyses that invoke these concepts are a fertile environment in
which the inside/outside fallacy may breed, because the temptation is to diagnose problems by
impeaching the motivations of officials or other political actors, then to propose solutions that
rest on high-minded premises about the motivations of whoever the analyst is asking to supply
the solutions. In this Section we offer examples of this fallacious two-step procedure.
It is not as though ambition, partisanship, and process failures are three different topics.
The connections are numerous and complex: ambitious people may promote their ends through
partisan or interest-group activity; parties are ambitious both as institutional actors and as
vehicles for the individual ambitions of their members; parties are to some extent merely
coalitions of interest groups; and so on. Nonetheless, we separate out the three concepts in order
to track different bodies of literature that have distinct, albeit overlapping, emphases. Ambition,
both individual and institutional, is the focus of a literature adumbrating and critiquing
Madison’s famous argument in Federalist 51 that a properly designed system of checks and
balances will make “ambition counteract ambition.” Partisanship is the focus of an enormous
literature in American political science, with particular emphasis on legislative-executive
relations during periods of divided or unified party government; legal scholars have usefully
arbitraged this literature to critique the Madisonian view. 8 Finally, exploitation of minorities by
majorities, self-entrenchment by incumbent officials, and rent-seeking by interest groups are the
focus of literatures in political economy and public choice theory. We will take up these three
strands of public law theory in turn, identifying the inside/outside fallacy in its native habitat.
A. Madison and “Madisonian” Judging
A number of recent contributions have clarified the Madisonian account of checks and
balances. 9 Heavily influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment ideas of Adam Ferguson and Adam
Smith,10 Madison’s Federalist 51 sketches an invisible-hand theory of the relationship among
lawmaking institutions under the proposed federal Constitution. What makes Madison’s theory
an invisible-hand theory is that he does not suppose that officials in the new lawmaking
institutions will be motivated to pursue the public interest, however defined. Rather they will be
acting to promote their individual ambitions; those ambitions will be tied to the long-run interests
of the institutions they staff (“the interests of the man will be connected to the rights of the
place”); and the result will be a system of institutions competing with each other to promote their
interests. The point of such a system is to prevent tyranny, defined as the accumulation in a
8

See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2005).
See, e.g., Nick Barber, Institutional Self-Defence (Oxford Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 61/2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162129; Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Power Arguments and the
Structural Constitution (U. Chi. Inst. L. & Econ. Olin Research Paper No. 622, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2178725; ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2011).
10
See ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1767); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
9
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single institution of all legislative, executive and judicial powers. The invisible-hand system of
institutional competition, in other words, produces liberty as a byproduct of individually and
institutionally self-interested behavior -- just as actors in competitive markets, like Adam
Smith’s butcher, indirectly produce social goods as a byproduct of self-interested motives.
Legal theorists have criticized this account on many fronts. For one thing the baseline
from which balance of powers is to be measured is conceptually ambiguous and empirically
unclear. 11 For another the connection between officials’ individual interests and institutional
interests is weak, especially in Congress; the dominant motivation for legislators is partisanship,
not institutional ambition, so that Madisonian competition among institutions is replaced by
partisan competition. (We examine this view in I.B., and will also examine a variant view,
asymmetric Madisonianism, which posits that the presidential bureaucracy does systematically
protect and promote the long-run interests of the Presidency as an institution, while on the
legislative side there is much weaker incentive to defend congressional prerogatives).
Furthermore, Madison’s account is an ersatz invisible-hand system, which lacks the key causal
mechanism that might in principle (if not in practice) make Smithian market competition socially
beneficial. By contrast with competition in ideal markets, Madisonian competition lacks a price
mechanism that aligns the outcomes of the invisible-hand system with social welfare. 12
For now, we set aside these critiques to focus on the way in which legal scholars have
attempted to carry forward the Madisonian vision. The main argument of interest here is an
argument for what we will call “Madisonian” judging, in which judges act as impartial regulators
or referees of the competitive system, attempting to promote an ongoing system of checks and
balances over time. The quotation marks indicate that, in our view, the argument is fallacious, a
kind of category mistake. Judging of that sort may or may not be defensible on other grounds,
but cannot be justified on the basis of Madison’s invisible-hand theory of checks and balances.
Any attempt to do so will end up committing the inside/outside fallacy.
“Madisonian” judging supposes that the proper role of courts, in controversies involving
the separation of powers and the structure of government, is to prevent “encroachment” or
“aggrandizement” in which one branch absorbs all or part of the power of another. 13 (In
Madison’s original and narrow formulation, tyranny would arise only when one branch absorbed
the whole power of another, but the post-Madisonian theory usually ignores this restriction and
treats partial encroachment identically to wholesale conquest; we will follow suit). In this vision,
relentless competition between the “political branches” -- an odd locution that legal theorists use
to denote the non-judicial branches -- needs an impartial referee, one who occupies the same
position in relation to the lawmaking system as an impartial antitrust regulator occupies in
relation to the system of market competition. The judicial branch is that referee.
11

See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 603
(2001); Posner, supra note 9.
12
VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 42.
13
For discussions of aggrandizement in constitutional doctrine and theory, see, for example, Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 727 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122–23 (1976);
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994); Daryl Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 916 (2005); Thomas P. Crocker,
Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1551 (2011).
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Whatever may or may not be said on behalf of such a vision, it is emphatically not
derivable from Madison’s invisible-hand argument. Nothing in that argument posits the existence
of a branch of government that functions as an external regulator of the competitive system. On
the contrary, the frame of Madison’s argument supposes that “exterior provisions” 14 for
protecting liberty amount to little more than “parchment barriers,” 15 compliance with which will
fail the test of incentive-compatibility; no institution will have both the capacity and incentive to
enforce such a set of arrangements. The challenge for the constitutional designer is precisely to
set up naturally self-regulating institutional mechanisms, resting on the powerful motives of
ambition and self-interest rather than the feeble motive of promoting the common good. The
point of the very title of Federalist 51 -- “The Structure of the Government must Furnish the
Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments” -- is that checks and balances
must arise endogenously from structural competition, rather than from the exogenous commands
of the antitrust regulator.
Put differently, arguments for “Madisonian” judging go wrong by assuming that judges
stand outside the Madisonian system. That amounts to a confusion of perspectives. Madison
writes as a constitutional designer trying to persuade constitutional ratifiers. Both Madison and
his audience stood outside the system of institutional competition that would, upon ratification,
be established by the new Constitution. But there is not a word in Federalist 51 suggesting that
the judicial branch, an institution within the new constitutional order, will somehow stand
outside the system of mutual checking through institutional ambition. Indeed, throughout The
Federalist Madison lists the “judiciary department” as on the same footing as the legislative and
executive departments; each must be given the capacity and incentive for self-defense, and the
motive power of institutional self-defense must be supplied by tying individual to institutional
ambition. Madison does think that the greatest risk of aggrandizement comes from the
“legislative vortex” 16 but this does not imply that judges are outside the competitive system he
would erect; it merely implies that both the executive and the judges must be given especially
powerful means of self-defense. Madison says exactly that as to the executive, and the logic
extends to the judicial branch as well. The framers, socialized in the traditions of English law in
which all judges were at least in theory the Crown’s judges, had only a hazy conception of the
distinction between executive and judicial power; there is no reason to think that Publius
expected the judiciary branch to behave differently, from the standpoint of institutional selfdefense, than the executive branch.
The true Madisonian perspective, then, is the external standpoint of a designer of the
constitutional system, who must also perforce be an analyst of politics. From that standpoint, the
judiciary is just another of the branches struggling to encroach upon the others or to aggrandize
itself at the expense of the others; judges are just part of the invisible-hand system, not some sort
of external regulator of the system. Indeed, the paradoxical logic of the true Madisonian
perspective is that the invisible-hand system may work well only if judges, presidents or
legislators do not consider the overall welfare of the system, but instead attempt to aggrandize
the power of their respective branches. Imagine, for example, that public-spirited officials in the
14

The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).
16
Id.
15
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legislative and judicial branches incorporate the legitimate institutional interests of the executive
into their own decisions, while the executive single-mindedly aggrandizes its own power,
heedless of the legitimate institutional interests of the other branches. 17 The asymmetric
distribution of public-spirited motivations across branches might lead to a kind of doublecounting of executive interests, creating a long-run tendency to remorseless expansion of
executive power. That expansion might or might not be a good thing, all things considered, but
from a Madisonian perspective it represents a destabilizing force within the system of checks and
balances, which if taken to an extreme would defeat the original aim of preventing
aggrandizement. The best chance to prevent aggrandizement might be for the judges and
legislators to ignore even the legitimate interests of the executive, robustly contesting assertions
of executive power.
More abstractly, if universal cooperation to promote overall welfare is unattainable, a
competitive system might function best overall if none of the actors attempts to consider the
overall well-being of the system, and instead all concerned pursue their private interests. This is
a problem of partial compliance or second-best, one that arises in many domains. Analogously,
economists and political theorists have argued that even if an economy in which all agents are
fully altruistic would be best of all, an economy in which all agents are entirely self-interested
might do better for all than an economy in which agents are somewhat altruistic (or only some
agents are altruistic). 18 Likewise, in an adversarial system of litigation, judges might obtain the
most useful information from litigants if each party advocates relentlessly for its own interests,
rather than attempting to consider the other party’s interests from an impartial perspective. 19
These are just possibilities, as is our parallel point about a Madisonian system. But it is a serious
complication for “Madisonian” judging that judicial attempts to stand outside the system, as an
impartial referee or antitrust regulator, might make things worse, not better, from the very
standpoint of preventing aggrandizement.

17

See VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 39–40.
Serge-Christophe Kolm, Introduction to the Economics of Altruism, Giving, and Reciprocity, in 1 HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND ALTRUISM 1 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds.,
2006) (hereinafter HANDBOOK); Jon Elster, Altruistic Behavior and Altruistic Motivations, in HANDBOOK, supra, at
183.
19
VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 91–93.
18
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B. Partisan Competition
An alternative to the Madisonian system of institutional competition is a system of
partisan competition. In the political economy literature that models interactions -- checks and
balances -- among institutions in a system of separated powers, a common modeling constraint is
some rule that prevents Coasean bargains among actors to carve up or reallocate powers on
mutually beneficial lines. 20 Such a constraint is a necessary prerequisite to a functioning system
of mutual checks among separated institutions; if actors may costlessly bargain to reallocate
powers among themselves, then the Constitution’s specification of powers and functions will be
circumvented. Low transaction costs defeat the separation of powers across institutions. 21
Political parties illustrate the Coasean vulnerability of the Madisonian system. Parties, on
this perspective, are coalitions of actors who implicitly bargain to reallocate powers among
themselves, regardless of the long-run power or interest of the institutions they happen to
temporarily control. If, for example, Congress and the Presidency are both controlled by the
same party, there is no reason to expect vigorous institutional competition between the branches.
The individual interests of legislators will be tied to the interests of their partisan coalition, not to
those of Congress as an institution; the “interests of the man” will come untethered from “the
rights of the place.” There is no reason to think that partisan interests will or will not
systematically or routinely correlate with long-run institutional interests, although they may do
so fortuitously and in the short run.
In the legal literature, Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes have offered an important and
clarifying argument that the U.S. system is one of “separation of parties, not powers.” 22 To be
sure, our system displays both separation of parties and separation of powers. 23 In the
configuration of divided government, in which Congress and the Presidency are controlled by
different parties, partisan interests happen to align with institutional divergence, producing
institutional conflict and competition that may if anything be all too vigorous. But even then the
institutional competition is in part a byproduct of partisan competition, so Levinson and Pildes
are surely correct that the Madisonian vision of institutional competition is a distinctly poor
guide to observed political behavior, in large part because parties reallocate powers along lines
that are orthogonal to institutions. Accordingly, Levinson and Pildes worry most about periods of
unified government; their concern is that parties will transform the Madisonian system into a
system of excessively concentrated powers, through delegation and other mechanisms.
This diagnosis rests on an external account of the system of partisan competition, one that
draws upon political science and economics to explain the motivations of actors in the
constitutional order. When the discussion turns to prescriptions, however, things change.
Levinson and Pildes offer a number of proposals for ameliorating the harms of unified
government. Among these are prescriptions offered to (1) the judiciary, (2) “democratic
20

GEOFFREY BRENNAN & ALAN HAMLIN, DEMOCRATIC DEVICES AND DESIRES (2001); TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO
TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS (2005).
21
Donald Wittman, The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM 73–84 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989).
22
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 8.
23
Richard Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210 (2006) (responding to Levinson
& Pildes, supra note 8).
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institutional designers” and (3) the political parties themselves. 24 All three sets of prescriptions
assume the internal perspective of their respective addressees, and all three suffer from versions
of the determinacy paradox. If the diagnosis of partisan competition is correct, there may be no
institution with both the capacity and incentive to supply solutions. Levinson and Pildes, that is,
offer supply-side prescriptions that may fail the test of incentive-compatibility, given their own
account of political motivations. This is not to say that their prescriptions necessary fail
incentive-compatibility. Perhaps some further conditions might be specified that would make the
supply side of the story hang together with the demand side. But the prescriptions cannot simply
be assumed or stipulated to succeed, based on a theory of motivations inconsistent with the
theory that underpins the diagnosis.
The prescriptions offered to the judiciary include, inter alia, suggestions for ways in
which judges might massage the constitutional law of separation of powers, and the closely
related interpretive default rules concerning statutory authorization of presidential action, in
order to ameliorate or check the potential harms arising from unified partisan government. But
this amounts to a sudden switch to an internal perspective that assumes public-spirited judging; it
implicitly treats the judiciary as outside the partisan system that the diagnosis describes as
ubiquitous. Why should the judges be any different? Unified government, at least if protracted
for a sufficient period, would mean that judges associated with one party control the judiciary,
and in effect reallocate powers to a branch controlled by the same party, through their
constitutional rulings.
It is no answer to observe that Article III judges enjoy life tenure and are thus putatively
insulated from politics. That insulation liberates the judges to indulge their preferences, subject
to the constraints of the reactions of other institutions. But the preferences that are indulged may
themselves be partisan ones. Because parties control the selection mechanism, judges will be
selected on a more or less partisan basis, subject to the constraints of what the other party will
agree to. Even the latter constraint will give way in periods of unified government, when both
President and Senate are dominated by the same party. The literature in political science on the
determinants of judicial voting finds a strong partisan influence. Although law also matters, and
although partisanship matters most in certain classes of cases and at the Supreme Court, still and
all, the single best predictor of judicial votes in cases where there is disagreement is generally the
political party of the appointing president. 25 Moreover, studies that have attempted to determine
the causal mechanisms that bring judicial rulings into alignment with majoritarian preferences
have found that the main channel is selection -- selection of judges with the right ideological
proclivities. 26 Those judges need not, of course, subjectively experience themselves as casting
votes along partisan lines; the mechanism operates behind the judges’ backs, through bias rather
than ill intentions.
Judges are inside the political system, not outside it. If the system is structured and
pervaded by partisan competition, as Levinson and Pildes argue, then one cannot turn around and
24
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assume that the judges will be immune. If and to the extent that judges are partisan, so that
judicial votes are determined by partisan advantage (whatever the subjective experience of
judging), then it is pointless to give the judges public-spirited advice. Unless that advice
happens fortuitously to coincide with partisan interests, it will fall on deaf ears. Levinson and
Pildes clearly identify the anomaly, observing that “the judicial branch itself is hardly
quarantined, at least in the long run, from the effects of party politics. The hope that courts will
use constitutional rules to check unified party government must be tempered by the recognition
that the same unified government will be appointing judges and exercising some measure of
ongoing political control over the courts.” 27
Similar points hold for Levinson and Pildes’ other supply-side prescriptions, addressed to
“democratic institutional designers” and to the parties themselves. As to the former, Levinson
and Pildes are vague about who these designers are supposed to be; most frequently, they use the
passive voice and other constructs that leave it unclear which actor is meant to supply the
institutional prescriptions they recommend. The reason for doing so is clear. Most of the
institutional prescriptions that Levinson and Pildes offer are sub-constitutional -- involving
legislative rules to protect legislative minorities and administrative structures to insulate agencies
from partisan oversight. But this runs squarely into the determinacy paradox. Such rules will
have to be supplied by Congress, but according to the terms of Levinson and Pildes’ diagnosis
legislators act principally on partisan motivations, and it is unclear why they will have any
incentive to supply institutions intended to ameliorate partisanship or the effect of unified
government. 28 To enact the relevant rules and institutions would require, in many cases, the
approval of both houses of Congress plus the President; they are thus most easily enacted during
periods of unified government, precisely the periods in which the dominant party will have the
least interest in enacting them.
A fortiori, the same holds for prescriptions addressed directly to the parties. When
Levinson and Pildes say things like “we might use legal rules and institutions to prevent strong
parties from unifying government so thoroughly as to threaten Madisonian values,” 29 one wants
to ask who this “we” is supposed to be. We act principally through parties, or so Levinson and
Pildes have argued, and the question is why parties would have any incentive to listen to such
advice or to adopt it. The point is not that such arrangements could never come about. In certain
27
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political configurations, certain mechanisms might explain why parties cede rights to legislative
minorities, create agencies insulated from their own control, or otherwise act against their
seeming short-run interests. Work in political science explores such mechanisms. 30 But as is
common in the legal literature, Levinson and Pildes do not discuss such supply-side mechanisms
in any detail, and their existence cannot by any means simply be assumed.
We have lingered on Levinson and Pildes because of the importance of their work on
partisan competition and the constitutional order, but similar inside/outside problems crop up
elsewhere. Another example is a recent and important paper by Curt Bradley and Trevor
Morrison on acquiescence and historical gloss in separation of powers law. 31 The traditional
notion, captured by Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 32 is that a long-continued pattern of executive behavior known to and acquiesced in by
Congress can create a “gloss” on presidential power that becomes part of the operating
constitution.
Bradley and Morrison draw upon the political science literature and related legal work to
launch a devastating critique of that idea. Congress faces severe problems of collective action;
even if all legislators would benefit from defending the long-run interests and prerogatives of
Congress as an institution, individual legislators’ incentives are political and partisan, above all
to seek re-election. Given the public-good character of legislative self-defense, that good will be
undersupplied and Congress as an institution will often fail to protect itself from presidential
aggrandizement. The institutional Presidency, by contrast, suffers fewer problems of collective
action because it has a relatively unified and hierarchical structure, and because there is a
standing executive bureaucracy, in the White House Counsel’s Office and elsewhere, devoted to
protecting presidential prerogatives. Although Bradley and Morrison do not use the term, their
picture is in effect one of asymmetric Madisonianism, in which the Presidency as an institution
does a much better job of protecting its interest than does Congress. It follows from this analysis
that the acquiescence doctrine is suspect, because Congress will sometimes or often fail to take
action to protect itself even when it should (from a Madisonian point of view). Congressional
silence is a poor proxy for substantive agreement or a tacit interbranch bargain; rather it may
indicate only inertia and failures of collective action among legislators.
So far the analysis is highly persuasive. But when Bradley and Morrison turn to the
prescriptive questions, they never ask whether the system of asymmetric Madisonianism that
they discuss at the stage of diagnosis might affect the behavior of judges as well; rather the
judges are assumed to be outside the system. In their words,
[T]he same shortcomings with the Madisonian model that undercut claims of
congressional acquiescence in general also carry specific implications for the role
of the courts in this area....The implication here is that courts should be more
30
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circumspect about invoking congressional acquiescence as a basis for deferring to
executive practice. By itself, this point does not defeat all arguments for judicial
deference in matters relating to executive power. But it does suggest that such
arguments should be closely scrutinized, to ensure that they are not based on the
kinds of Madisonian assumptions about congressional capacity and motivation that
we have shown to be problematic here. 33
But the judges to whom the prescription is addressed may have no incentive to heed it, for the
very reasons given in the diagnosis. The core issue Bradley and Morrison identify is that
Presidents do a better job of attending to the long-run institutional interests of the Presidency
than partisan legislators do of attending to the long-run institutional interests of the Congress.
Which motivation -- institutional aggrandizement or partisan advantage -- dominates judicial
behavior? Either answer would compromise Bradley and Morrison’s prescriptions. If judges are
good Madisonian actors who attempt to aggrandize the judiciary -- if the “interests of the
[judge]” are tied to the “rights of the [institutional judiciary]”, to adapt Madison’s phrase -- then
judges will follow Bradley and Morrison’s suggestions only insofar as doing so promotes the
judiciary’s interests. 34 Those interests, however, run orthogonally to the beneficial functioning of
the Madisonian system, viewed from the external standpoint of the system designer or theoretical
analyst.
Conversely, suppose that the judiciary is not a good Madisonian actor. Suppose, given
that there are hundreds of Article III judges arranged in a somewhat loosely centralized
hierarchy, that the judiciary suffers from problems of collective action similar to those that afflict
Congress. Judges’ individual incentives need not align, and may or may not systematically align,
with the aim of Bradley and Morrison’s advice, which are to promote the healthy overall
functioning of the Madisonian system. Here too it is critical that the judges who are supposed to
supply remedies are themselves selected by the very actors whose pathologies (from the
Madisonian standpoint) are at issue. One of the main channels of long-run presidential influence
is the selection of judges. If Congress -- particularly the Senate -- is unable to organize
consistently to defend congressional prerogatives during the process of appointment and
confirmation, the consequence may be a systematic tendency, over time, for the judiciary to be
composed of judges who happen to believe, quite sincerely, that the Constitution correctly read
imposes substantial constraints on Congress, favors expansive executive power, or both. Such
judges will, for the very reasons identified in Bradley and Morrison’s diagnosis, be resistant to
their prescriptions.
33
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This is just one empirical possibility among many. It is also logically possible that in any
given case, judges’ incentives or biases will happen to align with the goals of a well-motivated
designer of a sustainable system of Madisonian competition. But any such alignment may be
fortuitous and temporary. Nor is the possibility limited to judges; the President’s self-regarding
incentives might, in particular circumstances, lead him to protect congressional prerogatives, say
from judicial attack. The contingencies are unlimited and complex, and it is possible to specify
just the right combination of assumptions to get almost any story off the ground, at least for a
short flight. But there is no general and systematic reason to think either that there will be, or will
not be, judicial demand for the sort of counsel that Bradley and Morrison offer. Substantively,
the issues are empirical and contingent, and we are (for present purposes) entirely agnostic about
the merits. Methodologically, however, the crucial issue we mean to raise is one of consistency:
Judges too are inside the system, and advice from the external standpoint will have to be
refracted through the motivations of actors within the system. The analyst’s first duty is to ensure
that the combination of assumptions she adopts is consistent, across both prescription and
diagnosis.
C. Process Theory: Majority Prejudice, Official Self-Dealing, Interest Groups
We have focused on Madisonianism and its variants, but structurally similar points apply
to other theoretical frameworks in public law; we will treat these more briefly. Our catch-all
label is “process theory,” stemming from sources such as John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial
review and literatures in public choice and political economy. 35 Process theories comes in many
shadings, but we will mention three main concerns: (1) majority prejudice that prevents the
impartial representation of minorities; (2) self-dealing by incumbent officials who choke off “the
channels of political change,” through institutional arrangements that in effect gerrymander the
political system to perpetuate themselves; and (3) vote-buying and campaign financing by
interest groups who cause legislators to act in ways that benefit the groups but reduce overall
welfare.
In all three contexts, theorists have proposed judicial review as a potential corrective. Ely
justified a great deal of the Warren Court’s work as an effort to promote representation of the
interests of minorities in a pervasively prejudiced system of politics, or alternatively to prevent
incumbent officials from insulating themselves against political challenge. 36 A generation after
Ely, public choice theorists argued that the role of interest groups in politics implied a need for
expansive judicial review; facing no need for re-election, life-tenured federal judges would be
less beholden to such groups and could deploy constitutional protections to block inefficient
(“rent-seeking”) legislation. 37
Here too, however, the theorists tended to offer skeptical accounts of the motivations and
behavior of political actors at the stage of diagnosis, while quietly dropping those accounts at the
35
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stage of prescription. The same motivations that cause legislators, interest groups and others to
behave in self-interested or prejudiced ways will cause those actors to constrain or negate
judicial efforts to correct process deficiencies. The theorists overlooked, in other words, that
judges do not stand outside the system; judicial behavior is an endogenous product of the system.
As to interest-group theory, for example, Einer Elhauge in effect identified the
determinacy paradox problem -- although not in those terms -- when he argued that
[t]hose advocating more intrusive judicial review rarely address this comparative
question. Instead the tendency is to emphasize the flaws of the political process
and then assume without analysis that the litigation process will operate better.
The litigation process plays the role of a deus ex machina that can correct the
flaws that grip the other lawmaking branches but is apparently without flaw itself.
But the litigation process cannot be treated as exogenous to interest group theory:
it too is susceptible to interest group influences. 38
If particular groups remain latent -- i.e. unorganized -- because they face severe problems of
collective action, then they will be unorganized for purposes of litigation just as much as for
purposes of electioneering, campaign finance and lobbying. Thus organized groups will have
systematic advantages in setting judicial agendas through case selection, in the quality of
advocacy they offer, and so forth. The simple accounts of collective action that underpin most
interest-group theory are insufficiently fine-grained to discriminate between action in legislative
and judicial arenas.
This is not to say that more fine-grained theories cannot be offered. Tom Merrill, for
example, replies that interest group theory rightly understood does justify more intrusive judicial
review, because (1) fewer resources are needed to enter the litigation arena than the legislative
arena; and (2) once litigation has begun, the marginal effect of further expenditures falls more
quickly towards zero in litigation than in lobbying. 39 If Merrill is correct, then Elhauge overstates
things when he makes the substantive claim that “the same interest groups that have an
organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies generally
also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts.” 40 But
whichever view is correct on the merits, Elhauge’s crucial methodological point remains
unimpeached: judicial behavior cannot be treated as exogenous or a deus ex machina -- a
miraculous intervention from outside the system. The analyst must follow through to determine
whether the same theories of motivation, cognition and behavior offered to diagnose a problem
also vitiate the remedy, including the preferred remedy of so many constitutional theorists,
expanded judicial power.
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The same holds with appropriate modifications for Ely’s theory of judicial review.
Suppose that a large, stable and prejudiced majority controls both the executive and legislative
branches by virtues of its domination over elections. Because the executive and legislative jointly
control the process of judicial appointments, that same majority may, either with invidious intent
or in a heedless way, filter out judges who would challenge majority prejudices and filter in
judges who share them. Or it may not do so, under certain conditions; the possibilities are legion
and the questions are ultimately empirical. But as a matter of methodological consistency, it is
incumbent on the Elyian theorist to explain why such a result will not hold, given the theorist’s
assumptions about other actors. 41
Likewise, if incumbents are choking off the channels of political change, one of their
principal concerns might well be to choke off the litigation channel that might be used to
challenge their entrenched power. Through appointment of members of the entrenched coalition
to the bench, implicit threats of retaliation, or simple refusal to enforce judicial decisions against
themselves, the incumbents would attempt to structure judicial behavior so as to perpetuate their
own power. They may or may not succeed in doing so, but the analyst must confront the issue
and attempt to identify the conditions under which the attempt will or will not occur and will or
will not prevail. As a matter of consistency, judicial behavior cannot be assumed to float outside
the political system, and the theories deployed to identify problems cannot be quietly discarded
when the time comes to propose solutions.
A final example, closely related to process theory and problems of majority prejudice,
involves a reaction to Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence thesis,” which holds (roughly) that
“blacks receive favorable judicial decisions to the extent that their interests coincide with the
interests of whites.” 42 On this view, an overwhelmingly white judiciary maximizes the
promotion of “white interests.” 43 If so, then it follows that normative advice to judges must take
this constraint into account or else prove irrelevant; arguments for favorable judicial decisions
for blacks must be cast in terms of the interests of whites.
The interest-convergence thesis has been criticized for denying the moral agency of white
judges who attempted to undermine segregation out of moral conviction, rather than raciallydefined group interest; this denial is said to encourage fatalism and passivity about racial
progress through constitutional law. 44 But the criticism fails if, in fact, the interest-convergence
thesis is true; then the relevant complaint would be not that the white judges lack agency, but that
they exercise their agency in morally objectionable ways. A valid criticism would arise only if
some analyst both subscribed to the interest-convergence thesis and also offered the white
judiciary normative advice to the effect that the judges should protect the constitutional rights of
blacks regardless of white interests. Bell himself, however, appears to have been consistent on
this score. 45
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II. Presidential Power and Emergencies
Inside/outside fallacies are frequently on display in debates over presidential power and
emergency powers. These debates are related to the broader debates over separation of powers
and checks and balances, and thus partake of the problems discussed in Section I, but there are
additional reasons why the inside/outside problem becomes especially acute in this domain.
Presidential power and emergency powers pose acute dilemmas for analysts and actors who want
government to have power to respond vigorously to emergencies, but who also fear that an
imperial Presidency will ride roughshod over legality and liberal rights. A common reaction is to
attempt to escape the dilemma by licensing presidential action that -- the hope runs -- will
somehow remain outside the system, setting no precedent for the future and maintaining the
purity of the law and legal rights. We will trace that idea through three different arguments, and
show that it rests on a conceptual confusion. Presidential action is always and necessarily action
within the system; there is no way to prevent such action from setting precedents. So too with
judicial responses to presidential action; whatever judges do will create a precedent, either de
jure or de facto, within the system.
A. Responsible Illegality
We will begin with a view of emergency powers that is widespread among liberal
commentators (liberal in the political theory sense). This view comes in a number of shadings
and variants, but the common theme is an attempt to wall off emergency action from the ordinary
legal system and constitutional order. The fear is that the need to allow government to act
vigorously in emergencies will cause judges or other actors to distort the normal rules in ways
that will license ongoing abuses when the emergency has passed.
Thus the commentators want government actors, especially the executive, to adopt a
posture of responsible illegality. The President, for example, if faced with the need to take
decisive action in emergencies that violates ordinary liberal rights, should do what needs doing,
candidly admit the illegality, and throw himself on the judgment of the public. The public in turn
may ratify his actions through legislation, retroactively immunize him from liability, pardon his
excesses, or otherwise excuse him from the ordinary legal consequences of wrongdoing.
Although this sort of regime has been justified in part on grounds of accountability, the main
impetus is to immunize ordinary law from the distorting effects of emergencies. Above all,
liberal commentators want to prevent the creation of a new equilibrium in which extraordinary
powers wielded in one emergency have become routinized in the legal system. 46
The mistake is to think that presidential emergency action can be somehow placed
outside the ordinary system -- outside the constitutional order of which it is a part. On the
contrary, even if judges or legislators refuse to give presidential action de jure recognition under
the Constitution, the cycle of illegality-and-ratification may itself become routinized as a part of
the constitutional order, resulting in the same substantive expansion of executive power in a
small-c constitutional sense. In Albert Venn Dicey’s account of martial law and emergency
46
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powers, ex post ratification or indemnification by Parliament of necessary but illegal ministerial
action is seen as a convention -- an unwritten political norm that, although not enforceable in the
courts of law, is nonetheless obligatory on the relevant actors. 47 So too in the American case.
The liberal commentators forget that the constitutional order comprises not only laws, but also
conventions that determine which laws must be respected and which may be broken, with what
consequences. Such conventions result, in part, from precedent-setting behavior by political
actors; an episode of illegality-plus-ratification will itself set a precedent. The overlay of
illegality-licensing conventions is just as much part of the system as the first-order laws
themselves. The liberal hope to set up a wall of separation between emergencies and the
constitutional system is thus doomed to fail.
Although the connection is not immediately obvious, the inside/outside fallacy lurking
within the argument for responsible illegality is another example of the determinacy paradox,
just as in the cases discussed in Section I. The diagnosis that underpins the argument from
responsible illegality is that presidents, legislators, judges and other actors have a set of
motivations and beliefs that threaten to produce a cycle of ever-expanding executive power -- a
one-way ratchet. Although proponents of the theory do not usually offer clear and precise
mechanisms to explain this cycle, the implicit picture is a reprise of asymmetric Madisonianism,
powered by emergencies: presidents seek to maximize their power and that of their office, while
legislators and judges are myopic, granting presidents expansive emergency powers today
without sufficiently taking into account the future consequences of the precedent that they set.
But the prescription, the regime of responsible illegality, does nothing to remove these
underlying motivations and cognitive shortcomings. If presidents are power-maximizers, then
will not admit that they acted illegally and ask the public for forgiveness; and if they are public
spirited, then there is no reason to constrain them with the law. 48
B. Robert Jackson on Emergencies and Precedent
The fantasy that emergency action can be quarantined through a principle of responsible
illegality bewitches external analysts of presidential and emergency powers, but a similar
mistake afflicts actors within the system as well. A classic example is Justice Robert Jackson’s
opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 49 the notorious decision that licensed internment of
Japanese aliens and Japanese-American citizens in a military zone along the west coast during
World War II. Jackson’s opinion attempts to square the circle of emergency powers by stepping
outside the system from within the system -- a conceptual impossibility.
In Jackson’s view, the judges were helpless to resist the military’s internment order, nor
should they wish to resist it. As to the feasibility of resistance, the nature of military problems
47
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entails that “courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the
authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint.” 50 As
to the desirability of resistance, “[w]hen an area is so beset that it must be put under military
control at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than legal.
The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution.” 51 But it does not follow,
for Jackson, that the courts should themselves review and uphold the military order. To do so
would create a damaging precedent, one that “lies around like a loaded weapon.” 52 Jackson’s
thought is that extra-legal military action creates a precedent if, but only if, it receives a judicial
imprimatur: “A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an
incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution.”53
Accordingly, Jackson adopted a seemingly paradoxical stance. He voted to discharge the
detainee, on the ground that the courts should not themselves enforce unconstitutional military
orders, 54 but he also indicated that the courts should not have attempted to interfere with the
Army in carrying out its tasks. 55 The only way to reconcile these two ideas is that, on Jackson’s
view, the courts should simply refuse to exercise jurisdiction if a detainee sues for review of the
military’s extra-legal behavior; Jackson’s hope is that the military will do what it needs to do,
entirely outside the legal order, while courts refuse to intervene.
Jackson’s opinion is beloved by lawyers, who hope to preserve law’s purity by extruding
military action into some realm outside the legal system. The hope is doomed to fail, however,
because there is a small-c constitution that surrounds and subsumes the Constitution. The
constitution is determined and structured, in part, by historical episodes that help to create
practices, norms and obligatory conventions. One of those practices or norms may itself be that
courts should step out of the way when military action is imperative; putative non-decisions of
the sort Jackson suggested in Korematsu would themselves amount to decisions to create a
behavioral, practice-based precedent of that sort, one that future judges or other actors could cite
on appropriate occasions. Judges may refuse to create a legal precedent in the narrow sense of
decisions in the judicial reports, but they cannot avoid creating an unwritten precedent through
their behavior. There is no way for judges to extrude military action and their refusal to review it
from the total system of constitutionalism (as opposed to Constitutional Law). Any judicial move
is a move within the system; there is no escaping the system from within.
In a non-obvious way, Jackson’s opinion falls into a version of the determinacy paradox.
The fear of creating a precedent is the fear that future actors will take a precedent that defers to
the military and use it in ways Jackson thinks harmful (the “loaded gun”). That amounts to a
diagnosis of the motivations of future actors; Jackson’s prescription is for the Court to decide
nothing. Yet the future actors, given the very motivations posited by the diagnosis, may also
claim that the decision to issue no decision is itself a precedent, one that requires inaction by
50
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subsequent courts when asked to overturn military action. Jackson’s view turns out to be
pragmatically self-defeating because of an inconsistency between diagnosis and prescription -the hallmark of the determinacy paradox.
At bottom, Jackson’s Korematsu opinion is Delphic and his assumptions unclear. There
might well be ways of understanding or specifying those assumptions to make his argument
cohere; here are some possibilities. Jackson might be making one of two assumptions about the
motivations of future judges. First, he might assume that judges on future courts, like his own,
will be motivated to avoid confrontation with the military. But if that is so, the prescription -avoid setting a judicial precedent -- will have no effect on them whatsoever. Second, he might
assume that judges on future courts blindly follow judicial precedents, and if that is so, failing to
set a judicial precedent may encourage them to rule against the military in appropriating
circumstances. But if that is Jackson’s reasoning, he needs to explain why future judges will act
differently from his own court. There is a third possibility, and that is that Jackson hopes that the
failure of his court (and possibly future courts) to endorse a military action will at least force the
military to justify its actions to the public, so that a heightened level of public attention will
substitute for judicial review. Only this last possibility escapes the inside/outside problem. So we
do not mean to deny that Jackson’s opinion might be reconstructed in a coherent fashion, only
that there is a prima facie inconsistency in his view, and that attention to the inside/outside
problem is a necessary precondition for clarifying his argument.
C. Emergencies and the “Noble Lie”: the Beneficial Illusion of Youngstown
One of Jackson’s major contributions to legal theory was his concurrence in
Youngstown, 56 with its famous three-category classification of presidential action: category one,
in which the action is clearly authorized by statute, so that the president wields the full combined
power of the legislative and executive branches; category two, in which statutes are silent or
ambiguous, so that presidential action occurs in a “zone of twilight”; and category three, in
which the action is clearly prohibited by statute, so that the president can rely only on his own
constitutional powers, and even then only to the extent that they are exclusive and paramount, so
that they trump the statutory prohibition. 57
Legal theorists, such as Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes, have elaborated Jackson’s
framework into a theory of presidential power during emergencies. 58 On this theory, courts
engage in constitutional review in ordinary times, but in perceived emergencies they ask whether
the president is acting with congressional authorization, validating the president’s action if but
only if that is true. Although judicially-developed constitutional rights may have to bend and
give way during emergencies, courts can at least ensure that presidential action is legitimated and
checked by democratic oversight, through a requirement of legislative approval.
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Legal-realist critics, 59 however, drawing on work by political scientists, 60 have
questioned whether this theory identifies a cause of judicial behavior or instead merely
rationalizes judicial behavior. The federal statutory landscape is so full of statutes, and those
statutes are so frequently vague or ambiguous -- especially with respect to the unanticipated
issues that arise in emergencies – that it is usually possible for judges to argue, with a straight
face, that presidential action in emergencies is authorized by some statute or other. Exhibit A is
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 61 which drew upon a hodgepodge of inapposite statutes to find
implied authorization for presidential suspension of legal claims arising from the Iranian hostage
crisis and pending in United States courts. The overall point is that a judicial determination of
statutory authority is often epiphenomenal, following from rather than determining the judges’
decision.
As against this, Issacharoff and Pildes reply that even though, or even if, the
authorization framework is partly illusory, it is a beneficial illusion, one that underscores values
of democracy, checks and balances, and constitutionalism generally. 62 The response is
theoretically interesting because it is not one that can be offered from within the system. It would
be pragmatically incoherent, even self-defeating, for judges to adopt the Issacharoff and Pildes
approach to presidential emergency powers and to publicly justify it by saying that the approach,
although a rationalization of decisions produced on other grounds, produces beneficial illusions.
The very act of justifying the illusion in this way would dispel it, so long as those supposed to be
subject to the illusion -- the audience for judicial decisions, including informed citizens -- are
told that an illusion is what the justification really is. The upshot is that the beneficial-illusion
argument must necessarily remain esoteric; it represents the sort of “noble lie” argument that
surfaces occasionally in constitutional theory. The noble lie requires that the true justification for
a practice remain concealed from the population subject to a beneficial illusion, which means
that judges cannot publicly offer that justification within the system. Analysts of the system of
emergency powers may propound it to one another, and judges may secretly harbor the notion
within their hearts, but the beneficial illusion cannot become the stated justification of the
governing legal regime within the legal regime. The determinacy paradox can be avoided here,
but only through subterfuge. 63
D. The Supermajoritarian Escalator
Finally, we may mention a concrete proposal that illustrates how the determinacy
paradox afflicts proposals for institutional reform of emergency decisionmaking. (Our treatment
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will be brief because we have already made the point elsewhere. 64) The proposal is Bruce
Ackerman’s idea of a “supermajoritarian escalator” -- a framework statute that aims to limit
presidential emergency powers through a procedural device. The statute would give presidents
unilateral power to declare an emergency (producing expanded executive powers), but would
also require legislative authorization after a short period. The threshold for authorization is
initially a simple majority, but rises in successive periods until it tops out at a stringent 4/5ths
supermajority rule.
The thought behind the proposal is that the framework statute will constrain presidents
from opportunistically seizing upon emergencies to expand their powers, and will prevent
panicky legislators from voting blank-check delegations of massive new powers to presidents in
emergencies. Yet Ackerman fails to follow through on that logic, which applies as much to the
prescribed framework statute as to actions that presidents and legislators would otherwise take
absent the statute. If legislators are panicky in the wake of an emergency, they may just as easily
abrogate the framework statute -- by a simple majority -- as they would otherwise delegate
powers to the president, absent the statute. And presidents, who by Ackerman’s hypothesis are
opportunistic power-maximizers, will have every incentive to portray the framework statute as a
dangerous legalism that hamstrings the executive and disables it from taking necessary action.
Ackerman’s framework statute is an attempt at legislative self-binding that fails, because the
same motivations and beliefs that make the self-binding desirable (in Ackerman’s view) also
make it incentive-incompatible.
The self-defeating supermajoritarian escalator illustrates our broader claim, that the topic
of emergency powers is fertile ground for inside/outside fallacies and the determinacy paradox.
There are two generic reasons why this appears to be so. One is that legal academics typically
combine distrustful pessimism about the motivations and cognition behind governmental
assertions of emergency powers with optimism about the ability of legal rules and institutional
structures to channel and constrain those powers. But this combination constantly threatens to
become self-defeating, because the legal rules and institutions at issue must themselves
ultimately be supplied by governmental officials, who are subject to the same motivational and
cognitive pathologies. The determinacy paradox arises when the assumptions about motivations,
beliefs and constraints that underlie the diagnosis are inconsistent with those necessary for the
prescription to succeed, yet this is the chronic state of legal theorizing about emergency powers.
The second generic reason is that legal theorists hope to keep the law pure and urge
judges and legislators to act accordingly. They hope, in other words, to reconcile raison d’etat
with legalism by identifying ways in which judges may act to create separate spheres, so that the
legal system remains uncontaminated by governmental action that does what needs to be done in
emergencies; such action, if extruded from the system, will create no precedents for the future.
The hope is conceptually self-defeating, however, because the very attempt to wall off
emergency action itself creates a precedent for the future -- namely a precedent that the President
may do what needs doing, that legislators will ratify the action ex post, and that the judges will
not interfere. That norm is itself part of the legal system in a larger sense that includes unwritten
constitutionalism, historical episodes and surrounding practices and conventions, even if the
norm is never written down formally in the pages of the reported judicial decisions. Emergency
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powers become part of the legal system writ large in spite of, indeed because of, the measures
that theorists urge to wall them off from the system.
III. Interpretation and Adjudication
We turn now from separation of powers and presidential power to more general themes,
including theories of constitutional interpretation, economic theories of litigation, and the role of
precedent in constitutional adjudication. The same paradoxes arise in these settings, albeit in
different form.
A. Originalism and Textualism
Justice Scalia is well-known for his support for originalism and textualism. Originalism is
the doctrine that courts should enforce the Constitution as it was understood at the founding,
rather than as it has developed over time. Textualism is the doctrine that courts should interpret
statutes as written, and not on the basis of legislative history. (We will bracket the apparent
tension between these two positions, which others have analyzed).
Justice Scalia argues that one advantage of these doctrines is that they limit the ability of
judges to decide cases in a way that advances their ideological or partisan preferences. For
example, textualism
will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making and acceptable
argumentation. It will curb -- even reverse -- the tendency of judges to imbue
authoritative texts with their own policy preferences. … Textualism will not relieve
judges of all doubts and misgivings about their interpretations. … But textualism will
provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect
for the rule of law. 65
He makes a similar argument about originalism, 66 and also more generally about the virtues of
rules compared to standards. 67
The premise of these arguments is that judges will be inclined to implement their political
or policy preferences; if that were not the case, then the self-constraining advantage of
originalism, textualism, and rule-following would be unnecessary. And because the Supreme
65
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Court supervises and controls the lower courts, it is straightforward that the Court can demand
that the lower courts adopt methodologies that suppress their political or policy preferences.
What is puzzling, and possibly paradoxical, is that Justice Scalia’s argument is reflexive. He
argues that his commitments to originalism, textualism, and rule-following also prevent him
from implementing his policy preferences. He urges others judges to adopt these methodologies
voluntarily so as to curb their own instinct to implement their ideological preferences.
The paradox can be seen from two directions. First, one can ask why a justice who seeks
to implement his policy preferences would adopt a method that prevents him from doing so. If
the account of motivation is correct, he would have no reason to adopt such a method. Second,
one can ask why a justice who is public-spirited enough to adopt a method to prevent himself
from implementing his policy preferences would not be public-spirited enough to decide cases
neutrally, case by case. Justice Scalia risks committing the inside/outside fallacy, as he asserts,
from an external perspective, a theory of judicial motivation that is inconsistent with the premise
of his normative proposals.
There may be a way out of the paradox. Suppose that judges care about two things: (1)
advancing their ideological preferences; and (2) maintaining their individual reputation for
impartiality. It is possible that if judges too obviously implement their preferences, they will
harm their reputations so greatly that the reputational costs to the judge will exceed the
ideological benefits. Thus, when judges decide cases, they will want to avoid implementing their
preferences when doing so is too obvious, and in these cases decide in a neutral or
nonideological fashion.
But then why would they not just do so? The argument depends on an empirical premise
as well, namely, that judges suffer from weakness of will and so, when confronted with an
ideologically charged case that has a clear answer contrary to a judge’s preference, will
implement their immediate ideological preference despite the (possibly only long-term) damage
to the judges’ reputation. Like a smoker or failed dieter, the judge cannot forbear from
immediate ideological consumption, despite knowing the long-term harms. 68 Justice Scalia’s
implicit theory seems to be that judges can lash themselves to the mast by adopting
methodologies like originalism and textualism, which function as self-binding devices. Perhaps it
is easier to stick with a methodology than to a more general commitment to decide cases in a
neutral way. If all these assumptions are true, then the determinacy paradox is evaded. Judges act
in their enlightened self-interest -- advancing their ideological preferences to some degree while
also maintaining their stature in the long term -- by being originalists and textualists. On this
interpretation, Justice Scalia’s argument is internally consistent: he is merely giving advice to
judges as to how to advance their own long-run interests.
We provide this argument only for purposes of illustration. Needless to say, that is not the
usual basis on which originalism and textualism are justified. Moreover, the theory does not
seem plausible to us. But the main point is that whether or not originalism and textualism can
ultimately be justified, any successful justification will have to offer empirical premises that are
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consistent with the normative recommendations of the theory. Here too, our concern is not with
the substantive merits of views, but with consistency between premises and conclusions.
B. Judges and Efficiency
Formalists like Justice Scalia are not the only people who commit the inside/outside
fallacy. It is easy to find examples among jurists and commentators who believe that judges
should act to advance policy goals. Consider the standard pair of ideas in the law and economics
literature that government officials act in their self-interest and that judges should maximize
efficiency or welfare. Judges are government officials, of course, and so then the question arises
why judges acting in their self-interest would ever accept the advice to maximize efficiency or
welfare.
The puzzle has produced a large but inconclusive literature. 69 One approach is simply to
assert that judges somehow lie outside the rules that apply to everyone else. 70 Perhaps lifetime
tenure enables judges to act in a less self-interested way. But most common law judges in the
United States are subject to election, and in any event a standard feature of principal-agent
models in economics is that the agent who is not constrained by a principal will act in her own
interest, not in the interest of the principal or of the public more generally.
The opposite approach is that judge’s personal preferences do not matter because of
structural features of litigation. If judges choose efficient legal rules, parties will settle; only
inefficient rules will be subject to the pressures of the litigation process; and rules will eventually
become efficient. 71 These theories have been shown to rest on highly fragile assumptions, 72 but
even if these assumptions were robust, the theories would not avoid the inside/outside fallacy. If
the evolutionary pressures of litigation ensure that the law will be efficient, then the advisor
might as well keep silent. Efficiency arises in these models through an invisible-hand
mechanism, not because judges intentionally seek to promote the public interest. The judges in
the model either behave randomly or have no interest in public-spirited advice.
Models of more recent vintage assume more complex motivations for judges. Judges
might care about various policy outcomes; minimizing the risk of being overturned; avoiding too
much work; or getting reelected. 73 One can avoid the inside-outside fallacy and still make
normative recommendations by assuming that judges at least partly care about advancing the
public interest. The current challenge is to do so in an empirically reasonable way. Here again,
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the inside/outside fallacy can be sidestepped, but there is a further question whether the
assumptions needed to sidestep it are plausible. Whether or not they are plausible, identifying the
fallacy clarifies the issues by eliminating inconsistent assumptions that posit one type of
behavior for purposes of diagnosis, and a different type of behavior for purposes of prescription.
C. Bush v. Gore and the Non-precedent Precedent
Bush v. Gore arose out of the disputed presidential election in 2000. Bush had received
more votes than Gore after the initial count of ballots, but the difference was small. Gore claimed
that the vote count was inaccurate and, after litigation in the lower courts, persuaded the Florida
Supreme Court to order a recount. Bush petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for what was
effectively a writ of certiorari. The Court held by a 7 to 2 vote that the Florida Supreme Court’s
ruling violated the Equal Protection Clause. A 5 to 4 majority ordered a halt to the recount,
which gave Bush his victory.
The seven-justice majority focused on the procedures -- or, really, lack of procedures -that the Florida Supreme Court directed state officials to use in the recount of the ballots. As
David Strauss has noted, the Court’s holding can be interpreted as establishing a principle “that,
at least where the right to vote is concerned, the states may not use discretionary standards if it is
practicable to formulate rules that will limit discretion.” 74 However, this principle would have
been greatly at variance with the judicial philosophies of the five conservative justices, who had
generally deferred to the states on matters of voting. 75 Possibly for this reason, the opinion
includes this famous sentence: “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”76
While one could interpret this statement as merely cautioning courts in future cases that the
Supreme Court did not have adequate time to think through the implications of its holding, most
commentators have argued that the Court meant to deny Bush v. Gore precedential value, 77 and
we will assume that this latter interpretation is correct.
The conservative justices faced the same problem that Jackson did in the Korematsu case,
discussed earlier. They wanted the case to come out in a certain way but did not want the
outcome to serve as a precedent for future rulings. For Jackson, the problem was how to avoid
defying the military in the particular case, which may have led to a politically damaging
showdown, without establishing a precedent that the president can intern American citizens
whenever he believes that they pose a threat to security. For the five-justice majority in Bush v.
Gore, the problem was how to ensure that Bush would prevail 78 without establishing a precedent
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that any voting regime that relies on discretionary standards is constitutionally suspect -- a
precedent that might, in their view, have been unwise as a purely jurisprudential matter, or
merely unpredictable, or possibly harmful for Republicans.
We argued before that Jackson’s approach was doomed to fail because, even under his
approach, a judicial refusal to interfere with military decisionmaking in Korematsu would have
established a small-c precedent. However, we could not provide any direct evidence, because of
the counterfactual quality of the issue. Jackson’s opinion was not the majority opinion, so it
could not establish even a small-c precedent. The majority opinion in Korematsu is now
generally regarded as bad law; courts are reluctant to cite it; the case has, in effect, been
overturned.
Bush v. Gore provides a better test case because the precedent-limiting language appears
in the majority opinion. A number of scholars initially predicted that despite the limiting
language, the equal protection rule would have precedential value. 79 Others disputed this
prediction. 80 In fact, the evidence has borne out the prediction. 81 A number of lower courts have
cited Bush v. Gore in the course of striking down election statutes. Although some of the initial
rulings were overturned on appeal or reversed by en banc panels, 82 in recent years Bush v. Gore
has provided the basis for a number of final judgments. 83 For example, a federal court struck
down an Ohio law that restricted early voting for everyone except military voters, reasoning that
the distinction between the two types of voters could not be justified under the principle of Bush
v. Gore. 84 The same court, also citing Bush v. Gore, held that “Ohio’s disenfranchisement of
voters for voting in the wrong polling location because of poll worker error violated the equal
protection clause.” 85 Thus, the limiting language failed to have its intended effect.
The reason is that the Court acted within a system in which any statement or judgment by
the Court has precedential value. Lower courts try to predict how the Supreme Court will react to
their decisions; its past behavior is the best clue. And where there is a conflict within a single
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opinion -- here, between the judgment and the limiting language -- the judgment provides the
better guide for the future because it reflects an outcome rather than mere talk. It is reasonable
for lower courts to assume that cases with facts legally indistinguishable from those of Bush v.
Gore will be decided in the same way -- unless, to be sure, the Supreme Court’s decision was
partisan, but lower courts could not ignore a precedent on those grounds, even implicitly. The
Court could not suspend the rules of precedent for one case because the rules of precedent are
rules of the system in which the Court acts. Similar issues arise with respect to “unpublished”
opinions, which are sometimes cited by later litigants or courts, contrary to the intentions of the
issuing court. 86
As in Jackson’s Korematsu opinion, the Court’s mistake here rests on a non-obvious
version of the determinacy paradox. Fearing that downstream courts would use a precedent in
ways the majority would not approve, the majority in effect commanded those courts to ignore
the decision. But the majority’s positive theory of the motivations of downstream courts and the
majority’s command or prescription were pragmatically inconsistent. Given the posited
motivation on the part of downstream courts, those courts will also have every reason to ignore
the command, and to take the original decision into account the way they take other decisions
into account. The attempt by the Bush v. Gore majority to deny precedential effect to its own
decision thus rested on a self-refuting theory of the motivations of the actors it attempted to bind.
IV. International Law
Inside/outside fallacies also appear in debates about international law. International law
bears more than a passing resemblance to constitutional law because, like constitutional law, it
establishes the norms that govern the behavior of institutions while depending on those
institutions to enforce those norms. 87 It is this double nature that provides fertile soil for
inside/outside fallacies. We will focus on the example of humanitarian intervention, and then
more briefly show how this problem appears in other areas of international law.
A. Humanitarian Intervention
The UN Charter forbids states to use military force except in self-defense or with the
authorization of the Security Council. 88 It contains no exception for so-called humanitarian
intervention, where a state uses military force to protect a foreign population from abuses by its
own government. In theory, the Security Council may authorize a humanitarian intervention -- it
did so to prevent Qaddafi from massacring Libyan rebels and civilians in 2011. 89 But the
Security Council is usually reluctant to authorize warfare.
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In the years leading up to the 1999 military intervention in Serbia, ethnic Albanians in the
Serbian province of Kosovo had launched an insurgency, with the goal of obtaining autonomy
from the Serbian government. The Serbian government responded with harsh military reprisals,
and by 1999 a campaign to drive ethnic Albanian Kosovars out of the country, a form of ethnic
cleansing or possibly even genocide. Efforts were made to obtain Security Council authorization
for an international military intervention to protect the Kosovars and expel Serbian military
forces from the province, but they ran into resistance from Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia and
the possessor of a veto on the Security Council. Nonetheless, the United States led other NATO
countries in an air attack on Serbian troops and installations, which ultimately defeated Serbia.
The military intervention clearly violated international law. The Security Council had
failed to authorize it, and the self-defense exception did not apply because Kosovo was not an
independent country that had been invaded. A commission was established to evaluate the war
and, in the end, came to the conclusion that the war was “illegal but legitimate.” 90 This
formulation meant that the law violation was morally justified. It seemed to satisfy commentators
who opposed legalizing humanitarian intervention because of the fear that such an exception to
the UN regime would enable states to rationalize predatory wars by pointing to human rights
violations in the target state, yet who also believed that the 1999 intervention was in fact
justified. 91 By maintaining the posture of illegality, this stance deters countries from engaging in
war except when the humanitarian purpose is genuine.
But the argument is questionable. If the Kosovo intervention was legitimate, then any
humanitarian intervention under similar conditions is legitimate. In future cases, states that
launch invasions will be able to point to Kosovo as a moral if not legal precedent, and be able to
argue that since the Kosovo intervention was permitted, their interventions should be as well. If
the reason to avoid a legal precedent is that states can rationalize predatory interventions by
pointing out similarities to past humanitarian interventions despite their different motivations, the
same problem will apply to a moral precedent as well. So while the legal system remains “pure,”
the practical effect of its purity is nil. The rules of “legitimacy” or morality supersede the legal
rules, reproducing the problem of ambiguity at a higher plane, and so one does not really escape
the system; one just redefines it using different words.
The inside/outside fallacy is only implicit, as in the case of presidential emergency
power, but just as real. The behavioral premise from an external perspective is that states seek to
maximize power; that is why they need to be constrained by a legal system that does not create a
loophole for military attacks that can be rationalized as humanitarian interventions. Yet within
the internal perspective states are urged to launch humanitarian interventions for moral reasons
that are inconsistent with the behavioral premises. The effort to escape the dilemma by positing a
plane of morality or legitimacy that supersedes the plane of legality entangles the analyst in the
fallacy.
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B. The Problem of International Legal Change
International law lacks an institution like a legislature through which the law can be
revised and changed. When states seek to change international law, the most reliable method is
to call a convention, to which all states send delegates. The convention may produce a draft
treaty, and then the treaty becomes law if and when states ratify it. As a result of this
cumbersome process, international law can easily become out of date and hence is fragile, as
states may find themselves bound to rules that no longer serve their interests.
However, there is another mechanism for legal change --unilateral action on the part of
one state followed by general acquiescence by the others. The classic example is President
Truman’s continental shelf announcement. In 1945, President Truman announced that henceforth
the United States would regard the continental shelf abutting U.S. territory as under its exclusive
jurisdiction. 92 This announcement was a violation of international law, or at least portended
violation, as international law at the time regarded the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea
as under the jurisdiction of no country.
However, rather than object to the Truman announcement, other countries made similar
claims about their own continental shelves, and over time a consensus emerged that states had
exclusive jurisdiction over their continental shelves. Under general principles of international
law, norms qualify as international law when states regard them as legal norms and act
consistently with them. This test was satisfied, and so U.S. policy was no longer in violation of
the law. Many decades later, states ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty, which confirmed the
legality of the new norm. 93
Most commentators regard the Truman announcement as illegal, like the Kosovo
intervention. 94 The problem with this view is that illegality provides a presumption against
action: if states are told that some action violates international law, that means they should not
engage in it. Yet why would one tell Truman not to engage in an action that would end up
benefiting the world? One should instead say that the legality of Truman’s action depended on
the future reactions of other states. It would turn out to be legal if other states approved of it;
otherwise, it would turn out to be illegal. There is an analogy in common law development. An
act that might seem obviously illegal under common law precedents may be deemed legal by a
court that for policy reasons decides to overrule or distinguish those precedents. A lawyer
advising a client who was thinking about embarking on this act would need to predict the court’s
ruling in order to advise the client, taking into account the policy considerations that might
influence the court in a future case. But international lawyers have resisted this understanding of
change in customary international law, no doubt because they fear that this understanding would
make it too easy for states to violate customary international law on the basis of pretextual
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justifications. But then we are back to the fallacy, where one simultaneously insists on absolute
compliance with the law based on the premise that states act in a self-interested way, while
encouraging states to deviate from bad law for public-spirited reasons.
V. Themes and Solutions
Across these examples, the common setting involves a system, that is, a group of agents
who interact with each other according to a set of rules and produce some outcome. 95 Someone
standing outside the system (for example, an academic) proposes a theory as to why the agents
interact as they do, observes that the outcome is socially undesirable or suboptimal in some way,
and then makes a normative proposal as to how the agents should change their behavior so as to
improve the outcome. The classic example is Madisonian judging. The analyst first argues that
branches of government or the officials within those branches seek to maximize their power (the
behavioral premise) and then argues that judges should maintain a balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branches (the normative proposal). The contradiction is that if
judges too maximize their power, then they will have no reason to produce a socially desirable
outcome except in the event that the socially optimal outcome results from their powermaximization -- in which case there is no reason to make a normative argument (except insofar
as the analyst can give the actors advice or information about how best to pursue their own
interests, an exception to be discussed below).
A variation arises when an agent within the system makes the proposal. As we have seen,
judges make the same Madisonian argument, first citing Madison for the proposition that
branches or officials are power-maximizers and then arguing that they should balance the power
of all branches rather than maximize the power of their own. The contradiction here is more
acute than in the case of the analyst. For here, by accepting Madisonian premises, the judges are
saying in effect that they are maximizing their power, even while they claim that they are acting
in the public interest. External analysts might be making inconsistent assumptions but they are at
least not refuting their own claim to sincerity.
Another set of examples involves agents who seek to cabin the effect of their actions, in
violation of the underlying rules of the system. If people act on the basis of predictions as to how
judges will make decisions, then judges cannot simultaneously make a decision and claim that it
will not be repeated in the future. Here, judges implicitly admit that people will be influenced by
their decisions, while attempting to assert that they should not be influenced by their decisions.
Similarly, when constitutional and international law change, agents are simultaneously arguing
that everyone should follow the law and that a particular form of law-breaking is justified
because of its socially beneficial effects. From an external perspective, people follow the law;
from an internal perspective, people should disregard the law when an emerging new law would
be superior.
As we have seen, the literature on the determinacy paradox in welfare economics makes
the same point, although in other settings. We understand the determinacy paradox to be
analytically coterminous with the inside/outside fallacy; these are different ways to describe the
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same problem. We prefer the latter description because it underscores that, in such cases, the
analyst confuses internal and external perspectives -- traditionally a central issue for legal
theory. 96 From the external perspective, the analyst seeks to explain the behavior of agents inside
the system. From the internal perspective, the analyst takes the viewpoint of the agents and asks
how the agent should behave so as to improve outcomes. If the external perspective is correct,
then it is hard to see how agents will act any differently from the way they do, in which case they
will not heed advice as to how they should change their behavior -- except insofar as the analyst
can offer instrumental information or tactical advice about how actors should best pursue their
interests. The analyst should propose that the rules of the system be changed, not that agents
within the system change their behavior; and the analyst must then confront the further question
whether any relevant actors have both the capacity and motivation to change the rules of the
system. If the internal perspective is correct, however, then the behavioral premises of the
external perspective must seem wrong or at least questionable.
It is not possible to avoid the methodological problems by characterizing arguments of
this sort as “ideal theory.” In these arguments, the very problem is that the analyst combines
ideal with nonideal theory in an inconsistent fashion. The analyst attributes nonideal motivations
to the agents or actors within the system for purposes of diagnosis, and then attributes idealized
motivations to those same agents or actors for purposes of advice-giving and prescription. Either
an ideal or a nonideal approach would be coherent taken by itself, and applied consistently to
both diagnosis and prescription, but the combination falls between two stools.
Are there ways out of this methodological dilemma? We can think of four.
Aligning the perspectives. One solution is to stipulate that people in the system have the
same public-regarding preferences as the outside analyst. Consider a theory of judging,
according to which judges are assumed to have public-regarding preferences, and the outside
analyst appeals to those preferences in the course of urging judges to improve the law, constrain
the executive, or take any similar action. Judges would no longer be able to cite Madison.
Instead, they would simply assert that they can maintain the balance of power between the
executive and the legislature because they, unlike the political branches, have the proper
incentives.
A more modest and plausible version of this argument is that even if judges do not have
perfectly public-regarding preferences, the norms of judicial practice are different from those
that govern legislative and executive behavior. Perhaps judges internalize the principle of
judicial neutrality or fear reputational sanctions from the legal community, or from the public.
Even though officials who appoint judges (or the voters that elect them) may have partisan
motives for choosing particular judges, everyone may expect that, once in office, judges will
respect norms of neutrality, at least to a greater degree than other political agents would. Thus,
judges are receptive to public-regarding arguments made by outside analysts, at least some of the
time.
Both of these arguments avoid the inside/outside argument, but that does not mean they
are correct. The first argument ignores the massive literature on judicial behavior, which
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provides empirical evidence of ideological or strategic judging at least on the margin. The
second argument incorporates that literature but in an ad hoc way. Indeed, the literature suggests
that judges are most likely to be ideological in high-stakes cases, 97 and among the high-stakes
cases are those in which judges are called on to arbitrate disputes between the executive and
legislative branches. Our point, however, is not that it is empirically impossible for judges to act
neutrally; it is, rather, that scholars typically fail to make well-thought-out empirical
assumptions. They instead proceed with unconscious assumptions about judges standing outside
the system, assumptions that are inconsistent, or at best not obviously consistent, with other
assumptions those very scholars make about the incentives of other officials.
Or consider yet another approach, according to which people are “normally” selfregarding or power-maximizing but on occasion can be roused to take public-spirited action.
Suppose, for example, that people act in a self-regarding way 95 percent of the time, and in a
public-spirited way 5 percent of the time. One might then argue that the analyst who assumes
that people are self-regarding but makes public-spirited proposals is on firm ground, as even if
the recipients of the argument ignore them 95 percent of the time, at least 5 percent of the time
they will advance the public good.
The problem with this argument stems from the theory of the second-best, which we
mentioned earlier. Consider the Madisonian theory, where it was regarded as urgent for judges to
maximize power so as to oppose self-aggrandizement by the executive and legislative branches.
If the Madisonian theory is correct, then judges should power-maximize even in the periods in
which they are public-regarding—that is, public-spirited motives should cause them to act as if
they were power-maximizing. In other contexts, there are other problems. Under the
Pildes/Levinson theory, for example, we would need to address all kinds of empirical
complexities—whether, for example, legislative and executive officials sometimes act in a
public-spirited way, and how that should affect the actions of judges. We would need to explain
why the balance of selfish and other-regarding behavior exhibited by public officials favors the
Pildes/Levinson prescription (strict review by occasionally public-regarding judges of normally
self-interested legislation when government is unified) rather than the opposite (deferential
review by occasionally self-interested judges of occasionally public-regarding legislation when
government is unified). As before, we do not deny that some theory, some just-right stipulation
of premises, could revitalize these arguments; our point is that the authors do not supply such a
theory.
Agents can temporarily exit the system. Another escape from the dilemma is to assume
that people can temporarily exit the system for the purpose of evaluating and revising it.
International law demands compliance from states, but from time to time states can disregard this
demand so long as they take the proper attitude toward it, for example, one of disinterested
criticism in the spirit of international cooperation. The analyst cannot influence judges within the
system but can advocate a change in the rules of the system. A flavor of this idea can be found in
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, according to which constitutional change
can take place outside the formal channels of amendment when the public is aroused by events
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and attentive to constitutional issues. 98 Law-breaking during extraordinary “moments” does not
degrade the law during normal times. Within-system behavior occurs during normal times, when
agents are assumed to act in their self-interest; outside-system behavior occurs during
emergencies or other special periods, when agents are willing to act in a more public-spirited
fashion. 99
This approach avoids the inside/outside fallacy but at the price of invoking a deus ex
machina. How exactly are people able to extract themselves from the system? A more satisfying
account is one that explains how people are capable of acting both normally and extraordinarily.
One might argue, for example, that the small-c constitution (or body of international law) accepts
law-breaking that is subsequently validated by popular (or sovereign) consensus. But this is just
an awkward way of saying that such law-breaking behavior is not law-breaking at all, or is so
only contingent on subsequent events turning out in a certain way. This approach forces one to
confront clearly the risk that the inside/outside evasion was meant to avoid in the first place: that
once people accept that law-breaking may be normatively justified for consequential reasons, the
law loses its authority, and people break the law more often for bad reasons than for good
reasons.
One can, as noted, also argue that any agent can advocate a change in the system itself. A
judge might argue that current incentives for judges are bad, and therefore the constitution
should be changed. Many judges and other commentators make just this argument about, for
example, judicial elections or lifetime tenure. 100 But while this approach is superficially
attractive, it does not really overcome the underlying difficulty. If, for example, tenure enables
judges to indulge their ideological preferences, then why should we expect them to do anything
different if they participate as citizens in the process of constitutional reform? Won’t they pursue
constitutional rules that benefit them even more? Again, one must assume that during temporary
periods agents can somehow overcome the incentives that animate them during “normal times.”
Perhaps that is true, but the assumptions underlying the claim must be carefully spelled out to
avoid the dilemmas we have mentioned.
The ad hoc stipulation. In Justice Jackson’s opinion in Korematsu, and the per curiam
opinion in Bush v. Gore, the ad hoc stipulation is used by an agent inside the system to attempt
to cabin the precedential effect of its behavior when it purports to act outside the system. Justice
Jackson purported to act outside the system by claiming that a decision favoring the military
should be rendered so as to avoid establishing a precedent. The per curiam opinion in Bush v.
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Gore purported to act outside the system by asserting that a decision that would normally have
precedential effect would have no such effect.
Consider the theory that the Bush v. Gore decision was a kind of judicial coup d’état. The
court stepped outside its normal role as constitutional adjudicator in order to hand the election to
Bush, or at least ensure that he would not lose on a recount. Taking the most sympathetic view to
the majority, we might suppose that the court acted properly either to avoid a constitutional crisis
or to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from throwing the election to Gore. 101 We might read
the majority as stipulating that it will act again only in a crisis—that is why it would be improper
to read the equal protection holding as precedent for future “normal” cases. But it could not say
so explicitly without risking its own credibility—perhaps, people would accept the Court’s
resolution of the crisis only if they believed the equal protection rationale.
If all this is true, one might interpret the inside/outside fallacy not so much as a logical
conundrum as an illustration of the constraints of public reason. It may be that public officials
can leave the system; the problem is that they cannot say they are doing so without subverting
their goals. The two international law examples also illustrate this idea: states publicly declare
their allegiance to international law and then argue that law violations represent extreme and
unrepresentative deviations that are confined to their facts, as lawyers would say, and do not
undermine the system of international law itself. The “noble lie,” which we discussed in the
context of Issacharoff and Pildes’ defense of authorizing statutes, is a version of this problem. It
seems to us questionable that noble lies can be maintained for any period of time, 102 especially in
the case of international relations where states are both the speakers and the audience; and it is
difficult to defend them in a democratic system.
Producing information. The most coherent and intellectually satisfying response to the
inside/outside fallacy is to cut back on the ambitions of the analyst. Rather than claim (for
example) that agents are self-interested and that nonetheless they should heed the analyst’s
public-spirited advice, the analyst can limit himself to advice that agents will follow because it
advances their self-interest. For example, without succumbing to the fallacy, an analyst could
instruct judges to neutrally balance the executive and legislative branch, because if they instead
followed the Madisonian prescription of expanding their power, they would lose public
support. 103 Power-maximizing judges would heed the analyst’s advice because it turns out that
the best way to maximize (or at least, maintain) their power is to serve as honest brokers.
The main problem with this approach is the analyst’s ability to make public-spirited
advice may be scaled down to such a degree as to cease to exist altogether. The opportunity to
make such advice depends on a happy confluence of events—where it turns out to be in an
agent’s self-interest to act in the public interest, and, for whatever reason, the agent is unaware of
this fact. Still, it is easy to think of examples. Academic experts in constitutional design may be
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able to supply local actors with useful comparative information when those actors are
engineering a new constitution.104 Critics of the Bush administration’s torture policies argued,
among other things, that torture is self-defeating because it causes the subject of interrogation to
lie, or because any advantage is offset by harm to the country’s reputation. 105 All rule-utilitarian
arguments have a flavor of this approach. An act that benefits society in the short-term has
negative long-term consequences; therefore, the government should comply with a rule that
forbids such acts, despite the sometimes overwhelming temptation to the contrary. The role of
the analyst is merely to remind the government of those long-term consequences, or to propose
ingenious mechanisms of self-binding that will allow officials to pursue their enlightened longrun self-interests, rather than short-run interests.
The most important version of this approach is the argument that a legal or constitutional
reform will produce a Pareto-superior allocation of resources. 106 Consider, for example, frequent
proposals to reform the filibuster, which can be used by the minority party in the Senate to block
legislation that it disapproves of. Filibuster reform usually fails because the minority party has no
reason to give up this power to protect itself, and the majority party wants to retain the filibuster
so that it can protect itself next time it is in the minority. The best proposals for filibuster reform
argue that, in fact, both parties misperceive their interests, and would benefit over time if they
can legislate more often (even if one side loses) than if they cannot. This could be the case if, for
example, gridlock in the Senate hurts both parties and clears the way for the rise of a third party.
Whether this is in fact true or not is an empirical question, but at least the reform proposal does
not fall prey to the determinacy paradox.
Conclusion
The inside/outside fallacy results when analysts or agents do not think carefully about
whether their normative proposals, offered from an internal perspective, are consistent with their
empirical premises, offered from an external perspective. We do not argue that the inside/outside
fallacy -- legal theory’s version of the determinacy paradox -- is a necessary feature of academic
research, or of real-world systems where agents within a system are expected to improve the
system as well. Nothing in our argument is substantive, or empirical; we urge no particular
assumptions about the behavior of judges or other actors. Rather, our argument is about
consistency.
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The fallacy occurs again and again in legal scholarship, probably because it is so difficult
to reconcile the tradition of providing normative recommendations to judges and legislators with
the behavioral premises of economics, psychology, and political science, which have had such
great influence in the last forty years. If one can predict how judges will decide cases based on
exogenous factors such as the party of the President who appointed them, then what is the point
of urging them to strike down or uphold Roe v. Wade on the basis of impartial legal
considerations? To be sure, one might want or might not want to supply them with straightfaced, legally respectable rationales for the view they will want to adopt anyway, but that is a
different sort of enterprise.
Judges are not machines, and it is empirically possible that they will be receptive to
certain types of normative arguments, as we have argued throughout. But then the analyst must
be clear that those normative arguments are not based on empirical premises that are at variance
with the analyst’s own assumptions about judicial behavior. Once again, we are making a
methodological argument about how legal scholars frequently make inconsistent assumptions;
we are not making a substantive argument that “all judges are political” or “all people act in their
self-interest” and therefore that it is never worth making public-regarding arguments to them.
And thus we are not condemning all legal scholarship, but simply urging scholars to be aware of
the way the inside/outside paradox demands greater methodological clarity.
It follows from what we have said that political science and law may have less to say to
one another than many constitutional theorists currently suppose. Or, less pessimistically, talk
across disciplines constantly threatens to descend into incoherence unless the conversational
parties are careful to tidy up their premises. The enterprise of explaining the behavior of actors
from the external standpoint is difficult to combine in a coherent way with the enterprise of
offering those actors sympathetic advice internal to the morality of the roles the actors adopt. At
a minimum, analysts who speak both as political scientists and as legal theorists must be careful
not to switch their hats so rapidly that they end up attempting to wear two hats at the same time.
The demands of intellectual coherence are that legal theorists must make clear, at any given
moment, whether they are adopting an external or internal standpoint, and must ensure that their
assumptions about the motivations, beliefs and opportunities of relevant actors are consistent
across positive and normative arguments.
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